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The past year has seen many brand the now president-elect Donald Trump as a fascist, citing his
narcissism, threats against minorities, and appeals to authoritarianism. Whether Trump is a fascist
or not, Jane Caplan writes that we may be able to understand him and what he represents better
by looking to the history of fascism, a political ideology that was able to draw on fears about ‘other’
groups during similar periods of crisis in the past.
Is Trump a fascist? Let’s start with another question: why do we want to know? Is it simply to stick
him with the most damning political label available? Or is it because his ideas, his actions, his
support really put him in the same genus as the fascist movements and regimes of interwar Europe?
For months, historians of the twentieth century have been looking nervously at Trump and asking what tools we
have to understand the man, his popular appeal and his backers – and to measure the danger he represents.
Against my own better judgment, I have been spotting Mussolini in this gesture or turn of phrase, Hitler in that one; I
have been watching the manipulated interactions of speaker with audience, the hyperbolic political emotions, the
narcissistic masculinity, the unbridled threats, the conversion of facile fantasies and malignant bigotries into eternal
verities, the vast, empty promises, the breath-taking lies. A whole repertoire seems to have returned us to the
fascisms of interwar Europe, acted out by a man whose vanity is equalled only by his ignorance. But has it?
Fascism has always been a challenge for historians to pin down, empirically or conceptually. It is not alone in testing
our precision. You could say the same of ‘populism’ – another term much in circulation these days – or virtually any
other ideological -ism; they all resist conclusive deﬁnition. What’s particular to ‘fascism’ is the combination of its
slippery meaning – like mud, easy to throw around – and the special political horror that attaches to it. Under this
term also slides its most horrifying incarnation, Nazism, waiting in the wings so to speak. But since Nazism has
become so closely identiﬁed in public memory with the Holocaust alone, it’s the more indeterminate ‘fascism’ that
takes the stage.
Thirty years ago, when studying fascism was a scholarly cottage industry, the historian Noel O’Sullivan suggested
that ‘the prevailing intellectual mood of our age has inevitably made fascism incomprehensible to us’, because
fascism – far less Nazism – was ‘not supposed to happen at all’. It contradicted the optimism characteristic of
modern western thought, but at the same time it exposed the tension between the activist-democratic and limited-
liberal styles of politics that have prevailed in Europe since the French Revolution: the fundamental question here is
how much power can be entrusted to the people. Fascism, like populism, is a creature of democratic politics, its
shadow and its threat – or, depending on your interests, its promise, a weapon with which to beat the masses back
into submission.
These questions are back on the agenda with a vengeance. ‘The intellectual mood of our age’ has been ambushed
again by something that now seems to have been lying in wait, gathering force, in Europe and now in the US. But
now it has to be confronted, not just historicized. Anyone who studies modern history always has at least one corner
of one eye trained on the present; and there are moments when the encounter between present and past suddenly
forces itself to the center of our ﬁeld of vision. The moment of Trump is one of these. But this eruption does not mean
simply that we should paste bits of the past onto the present and see if they ﬁt. The point is how the history we
already know can be used to make sense of the present.
I’ll focus on three of the most pressing issues where I think the history of fascism oﬀers us something usable. This
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leaves a lot out, and in any case the aim is not to play a taxonomic game, but to try to identify points of risk and
resistance. If I use the case of Germany, this is not to substitute Nazism for fascism in all its guises, but to disclose
some of the crucial mechanisms through which power can be translated into tyranny.
1. Crisis and opportunity: The fascist movements of interwar Europe were the creatures of war and defeat,
revolution and political violence, economic inequality and depression: in a word, systemic crises of national
identity and security. In Germany and Italy, they were eased into power by the patronage of elites who were
unable to control the pressures of popular democracy through the existing mechanisms of political parties and
the state. Today’s atrophied systems of political organization and representation are also struggling to
maintain their authority. The situation is by no means as critical, but Trump’s initial success has been built on
the exhaustion of the resources of the US party system, Democrat as well as Republican. The US has proved
vulnerable to the threat of a type of movement that groups itself on the edge of the body politic and does not
guarantee to play by the rules of the political or – potentially – the constitutional game.
The poster-child for political and constitutional manipulations was Germany in 1933. There the 1919 constitution
provided emergency powers for rule by decree that had become familiar by use and misuse in the 1920s and early
1930s. When the Nazi seizure of power began in 1933, the weapons of the constitution were too easily turned
against itself. It was decommissioned in all but name, taking all political and civil rights with it and turning power
over to an unfettered executive.
In America, the constitution may be more robust, but it has already given away some of its protections. The leading
edge of tyranny is the 2001 Patriot Act (twice reauthorized under Obama) which, among other things, authorizes the
indeﬁnite detention of immigrants suspected of terrorism and provides for the immunity of some FBI actions from
judicial review. Reliance on the power of the constitution will not be enough to guide strategies of defense against
tyranny. And one other point. The chaos of the transition suggests that this highly personalized movement, having
turned its back on political convention, will introduce a dynamic disorganization into government that will put orderly
decision-making at risk. Competing centres of power and distorted chains of command were endemic to fascist
regimes, exposing unregulated spaces for radical forces to exploit.
2. Figures of the enemy: In Italy and Germany alike, fascist regimes were carried to power on the promise to 2/4
2. Figures of the enemy: In Italy and Germany alike, fascist regimes were carried to power on the promise to
vanquish the threat of communism, physically as well as politically. Hence the systematic violence that paved
their way to power, and its unrestrained scale and intensity after they took over. Exploiting widespread
stereotypes, Nazi propaganda elided ‘opponent’ with ‘enemy’ and ‘criminal’; it identiﬁed ‘the communist’ and
‘the Jew’ as a composite ﬁgure of limitless threat and subversion who had to be eliminated from the body
politic.
For all the diﬀerence between the organized communist party of Germany and the diﬀuse Muslim and immigrant
presence in the US, America’s political discourse has proved vulnerable to similarly intensiﬁed images of ‘the Muslim
terrorist’ that are in essence no less troubling. In fact, Trump’s campaign played with great success on the double
equation Muslim/terrorist and immigrant/criminal, proposing excision as the solution to both. An absolute priority is to
force apart these tendentious and dangerous elisions, and to refuse militarized frontiers and mass deportations.
3. Whose interests: In the 1920s and 1930s, Marxist theorists held fascism to be a mass movement exploited by
capitalism to protect itself politically from the threat of communism. But the idea that fascism was not what it
seemed was more widespread than this. Numerous commentators from across the political spectrum also
warned that these movements that claimed to represent the interests of a wide spectrum of ordinary
members and supporters had neither the intention nor the capacity to deliver on their incompatible promises.
But once in power, maintaining the facade of that unity was what drove the violent repression of dissent.
The current globally mobile power of ﬁnancialised neo-liberal capitalism does not, on the face of it, seem to need the
defense of a fascist mobilization. It has sucked what it needs from the body of liberal states, and has been allowed to
ignore the remnant claims of their weakened ﬁscal institutions with staggering ease. Whether it can continue to do
this is at least in part an international question that cannot be resolved by the actions of a single state. Trump’s
victory has been widely assigned to popular revulsion against this, especially among those whose status and
livelihoods have been shattered by the eﬀects of neoliberalism, and who respond to his promise to restore jobs and
respect. Yet it is clear that the sources of Trump’s popular support were far wider than this, including many middle-
class voters motivated more by anxiety than despair, and by broader ideological motives. It may be a hard task to
keep his constituencies together. He will also have to confront the incompatibility of his stance on immigration and
trade protectionism with the needs of powerful US business interests. But we cannot rely on the eventual
fragmentation of his base; and in any case, will that matter? Or will power have been redistributed by then to more
impregnable locations than a disappointed electorate?
So what have we learned from the history of fascism? Caution, perhaps: not to cry wolf whenever we spot a political
opponent who does not look quite like us. This misleads and antagonizes in equal measure. In any case, what we
face is going to be appalling under any name. To combat it we need not to shout louder but to look more closely. So,
above all, vigilance: not to let misplaced moderation or sheer anxiety cloud our judgment as events unfold. Fascism
is not just the big bang of mass rallies and extreme violence; it is also the creeping fog that incrementally occupies
power while obscuring its motives, its moves and its goals. It is about inserting demagoguery, violence and
contempt for the rule of law into the heart of popular politics.
Detlev Peukert, a German historian who died too young, has bequeathed an eloquent summary of the elementary
civic and ethical obligations that everyone owes – not just in crisis, but always, and not just to people with whom we
already agree:
The values we should assert [in response to fascism] are easily stated but hard to practise:
reverence for life, pleasure in diversity and contrariety, respect for what is alien, tolerance for what is
unpalatable, scepticism about the feasibility and desirability of chiliastic schemes for a global new
order, openness towards others and a willingness to learn even from those who call into question
one’s own principles of social virtue. (Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany (1982), pp. 144-5) 
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This is our task.
A version of this article ﬁrst appeared at History Workshop.
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